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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 103(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Appellee, Michael Aviano ("Mr. Aviano"), notes that the Plaintiffs/Appellants
have failed to provide a citation to the record showing that their "Issues Presented for
Review" was preserved in the trial court, as required by UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A).
However, in the event this Court is still willing to consider the Plaintiffs' appeal, Mr.
Aviano submits the following as the issues which are presented for review:
Whether the trial court was correct in holding that the Plaintiffs failed to plead
fraud with particularity in their Second Amended Complaint against Mr. Aviano, thus
providing the trial court with a sufficient basis for dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based
causes of action? A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to UTAH R. Civ.
P. 9(b) presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey,
2003 UT App 339,115, 79 P.3d 974.
Whether the trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of
action without leave to amend when the Plaintiffs already had unsuccessfully attempted
multiple times to plead fraud with particularity? A district court's decision to disallow a
party leave to amend pleadings is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See,
Westley v. Farmer's Ins, Exchange, 663 P.3d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). Consequently, the trial
court's decision will not be disturbed "absent a clear abuse of discretion." Coroles, 2003
UT App 339, H 15.
6
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Whether the trial court was correct in holding that Utah does not recognize causes
of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting
fraudulent non-disclosure, thus providing the trial court with a sufficient basis for
dismissing said causes of action? A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant
to UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.
Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11,114, 203 P.3d 962.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
UTAHR. ClV. P. 9(b):

"Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of the mind of a person may
be averred generally."

UTAH R. ClV. P. 12(b)(6): "How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensible party. A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if
a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact
to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
7
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claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT
COURT.

The Plaintiffs filed an action against various individuals, including Mr. Aviano,
alleging various acts of fraud. As Plaintiffs action pertains to Mr. Aviano, Plaintiffs'
basis for its allegations involves a single real estate purchase transaction. See, Court
Record ("Rec"), 3055-3053,ffi[404-413.
On October 20, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint. See generally,
Rec, 461. After being served with various motions to dismiss pursuant to UTAH R. Civ.
P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on November 27,
2009. See generally, Rec at 2143. On February 19, 2010, the district court dismissed
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in its entirety with respect to Mr. Aviano, pursuant
to, inter alia, UTAH R. CiV. P. 9(b). See, Rec. at 5009. However, the district court
granted Plaintiffs leave to amend, provided Plaintiffs could do so in good faith and with
particularity. See, Id. As a result, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint
(which provides the basis for this appeal) on March 5, 2010, as well as lengthy Errata to
the Second Amended Complaint on March 15, 2010 (collectively, "Second Amended
Complaint"). See, Rec. at 4997, and 5048 (also attached as Exhibit "B" to Plaintiffs'
8
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Addendum, on file herein).
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint also alleged various fraud-based causes of
action against various individuals, including Mr. Aviano. However, with respect to Mr.
Aviano, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of action:
(1) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; (2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty; (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure; (4) negligent misrepresentation;
(5) conspiracy; (6) and Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity ("UPUA"). See, Rec. at 2978,
2953, 2947, 2945, 2926, and 2923.
The Plaintiffs based the foregoing causes of action against Mr. Aviano on a single
real estate purchase transaction between Mr. Aviano and The Preserve at Mapleton
Company, LLC, wherein the Plaintiffs1 suffered absolutely no damage. See, Rec, 30553053, t t 404-413. Specifically, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged that Mr.
Aviano executed various closing documents evidencing the fact that Mr. Aviano
purchased a certain parcel of real property for approximately $900,000.00. See, Id. at
3054, fflj 408-409, 2964, | 800, and 2932, | 944. Additionally, the Second Amended
Complaint alleged that the aforementioned closing documents represented that the
Plaintiffs, as assignees of MagnetBank, would receive approximately $900,000.00 from
the proceeds of the real estate purchase transaction.

See, Id. at 3054, ^[409-410.

Furthermore, the Second Amended Complaint expressly alleges that the Plaintiffs did, in
fact, receive $900,000.00 from the proceeds of the real estate purchase transaction. See,
l As successors in interest to MagnetBank.
9
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Id. at If 410. &e also, Rec, 2964, f 802, and 2931, \ 946.
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Aviano moved to dismiss the above-referenced
causes of action pursuant to, inter alia, UTAH R. Crv. P. 9(b). See generally, Rec, 5110.
The district court once again dismissed all fraud-based causes of action with respect to
Mr. Aviano, and did not give the Plaintiffs' a fifth opportunity to properly plead their
claims. See, Rec, 5606 (also attached as Exhibit "C" to Plaintiffs' Addendum, on file
herein).
STATEMENT OF FACTS PERTAINING TO M R . AVIANO

The Plaintiffs/Appellants address their factual allegations against Mr. Aviano in Yf
53-55 of Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal. Mr. Aviano provides the following
additional statement of facts with respect to Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Aviano
(which the district court held to be insufficient under UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b)).

See

generally, Rec, 5606:
1.

The Plaintiffs alleged "on information and belief that Mr. Aviano agreed

to lend another named Defendant/Appellee, David Simpson ("Mr.

Simpson"),

$2,000,000.00. See, Rec, 3055, ^ 405.
2.

The Plaintiffs further allege "on information and belief that as a condition

of the alleged $2,000,000.00 loan, Mr. Simpson would cause The Preserve at Mapleton
Company, LLC to sell Mr. Aviano a parcel of real property for $575,000.00. See, Id. at ^

2 Counting Plaintiffs' lengthy Errata as one attempt, in addition to the original complaint,
the first amended complaint, and the second amended complaint.
10
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405(a).
3.

Despite the foregoing allegations of a $575,000.00 purchase price, the

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Simpson and Mr. Aviano executed closing documents showing
that Mr. Aviano would purchase the parcel of real property from The Preserve at
Mapleton Company, LLC for approximately $900,000.00 (not $575,000.00). See, Rec,
3054,1408.
4.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the aforementioned closing

documents, the Plaintiffs were to receive approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds
of the real estate purchase transaction described immediately above. See, Id. at 1409.
5.

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that they did, in fact, receive approximately

$900,000.00 from the proceeds of the above-described real estate purchase transaction.
See, Rec, 3054, f 410, 2964, % 802, and 2931, f 946.
6.

Based upon the single real estate purchase transaction, described above,

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action against Mr.
Aviano: (1) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; (2) aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty; (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure; (4) negligent
misrepresentation; (5) conspiracy; (6) and UPUA. See, Rec, 2978, 2953, 2947, 2945,
2926, and 2923.
7.

The district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims against Mr.

Aviano, as well as Plaintiffs' UPUA to the extent Plaintiffs' UPUA claim was based on
allegations of fraud, and did so "for failure to plead with particularity as required by Utah
11
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Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)...without leave to amend." See, Rec, 5605. However, the
district court allowed the Plaintiffs to pursue their UPUA claim against Mr. Aviano to the
extent "that claim is not based on allegations of fraud." See, Rec., 5604.
8.

The district court further dismissed Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims

"for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CiV. P. 12(b)(6)." See, Rec, 5604. In
dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims, the district court held that "[t]he Utah
Supreme Court has not yet recognized a claim for aiding and abetting under Utah law."
See, Id.
9.

The district court did, however, deny Mr. Aviano's motion with respect to

Plaintiffs' conspiracy cause of action "to the extent such claim is based on alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties, which are not subject to the particularity requirements of
UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b)." Additionally, the district court denied Mr. Aviano's motion to
dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation cause of action, finding
that said cause of action "is not subject to the particularity requirements of UTAH R. Civ.
P. 9(b). See, Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b) requires the Plaintiffs to plead their fraudulent allegations
against Mr. Aviano with particularity. However, with respect to Plaintiffs' allegations
and causes of action against Mr. Aviano, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
failed to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b). Even if
Plaintiffs' allegations did satisfy the requirements of UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b), Plaintiffs'
12
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causes of action, nevertheless, fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano. Consequently, the
district court was correct in dismissing any fraud-based cause of action alleged against
Mr. Aviano, and the district court's ruling should be affirmed.
Furthermore, although the Rules of Procedure tend to favor granting a party leave
to amend its pleadings, "the matter remains in the sound discretion of the trial court."
Westley, 663 P.2d at 94. A district court is well within its discretion to deny a party leave
to amend its pleadings when doing so would cause unnecessary delay, and when the party
seeking leave has had an adequate opportunity to properly draft its pleadings. See, Id.
Consequently, under the circumstances of the present case, where the case had been
pending for eight months and the Plaintiffs had already been given four opportunities to
properly plead their allegations, the district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs'
fraud-based claims against Mr. Aviano without leave to amend.

Consequently, the

district court's ruling should be affirmed.
Finally, under UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant "admits the facts alleged in
the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." Helf,
2009 UT 11, | 14, 203 P.3d at 967. Because Utah does not recognize the aiding and
abetting causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, the district
court was also correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action,
pursuant to UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, even if Utah did recognize Plaintiffs'
aiding and abetting causes of action, in light of the Plaintiffs' allegations in connection
with those causes of action, the district court was, nevertheless, correct in dismissing the
13
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same pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), with respect to Mr. Aviano. Therefore, the
district court's ruling should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS
FAILED
TO
PLEAD
PARTICULARITY AGAINST MR. AVIANO.

FRAUD

WITH

"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity."

UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b)(emphasis added).

Furthermore, "the Rule 9(b) requirement should not be understood as limited to
allegations of common-law fraud...[I]t reachfes] all circumstances where the pleader
alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term
'fraud5 in its broadest dimension." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 39 (alterations in
original, citing Williams v. State Farm Ins, Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982).
Moreover, "where fraud lies at the core of the action, Rule 9(b) applies...The
requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to all cases where the gravamen of the claim is fraud
even though the theory supporting the claim is not technically termed fraud." Coroles,
supra (citing Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1985), and Adams v. NVR
Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D.Md. 2000)). Additionally, an allegation of fraud
asserted upon "information and belief is only adequate under UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b) if
such allegation "includes the facts upon which the belief is based." Kuhre v. Goodfellow,
2003 UT App 85, % 24, 69 P.3d 286 (citing Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 906 F. Supp.
1470, 1476 (D.Utah 1994).

However, conclusory and conjectural statements are
14
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insufficient. Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, \ 39, 190 P.3d 1269.
Even in light of Utah's liberal pleading rules, Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, nevertheless, fails to allege any fraud-based cause of action against Mr.
Aviano with the particularity required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b). Consequently, the
district court was correct in dismissing all such fraud-based causes of action with respect
to Mr. Aviano.
In order to state a claim for fraud, the Plaintiffs must have pleaded each of the
following elements with particularity:
(1) a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be
false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
See, Maack v. Res. Design & Constr., 875 P.2d 570 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994), and Gold
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996). As noted above, however,
Plaintiffs' base their claims of fraud on a single real estate purchase transaction, whereby
the Plaintiff, as an assignee of MagnetBank, suffered no damage. Specifically, Plaintiffs
allege that Mr. Aviano executed various closing documents, evidencing the fact that Mr.
Aviano purchased a certain parcel of real property for $900,000.00. See, Rec, 3054, ffl|
408-409, 2964, j[ 800, and 2032, f 944.

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the

aforementioned closing documents represented that the Plaintiffs, as assignees of
MagnetBank, would receive approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of
15
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the above-referenced parcel of real property, and that the Plaintiffs actually did receive
approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds thereof. See, Rec, 3054, ^ 410, 2964, f
802, and 2931, f 946. Therefore, based upon the Plaintiffs' express allegations, Mr.
Aviano is unable to see exactly how such a transaction can be deemed fraudulent when
the representations that were made were actually true and fulfilled, and where Plaintiffs
did not suffer any damage.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in an attempt to state a fraud-based claim against
Mr. Aviano, the Plaintiffs make the confusing, unsubstantiated, and speculative
conclusion that the aforementioned real estate transaction involved fraud because the
sales price of the real property was allegedly only $575,000.00, rather than $900,000.00,
despite what the aforementioned closing documents provided and despite the proceeds
actually received by MagnetBank. See, Rec, 3055, f 405(a). Plaintiffs also allege an
unsubstantiated conclusion that the difference

of $325,000.00 ($900,000.00 -

$575,000.00 = $325,000.00) was paid to Plaintiffs by Mr. Simpson. See, Rec, 2964, \
802. Plaintiffs, however, provide no factual allegations in support of these speculative
conclusions, not to mention failing to plead such factual allegations with any degree of
particularity as required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b). Even if the Plaintiffs allegations
concerning Mr. Simpson's alleged payment of a portion of the purchase price were true,
Plaintiffs still fail to explain or allege exactly how those actions can be deemed
fraudulent - especially in light of the fact that the Plaintiffs actually admit that they
received the $900,000.00 represented in the closing documents. See, Rec, 3054, % 410.
16
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Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the district court was correct in dismissing
Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of action, including Plaintiffs' cause of action for
intentional misrepresentation, with respect to Mr. Aviano.
In addition to the foregoing, even if Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Aviano
were sufficient under UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b), the district court was still correct in
dismissing Plaintiffs' intentional misrepresentation claim against Mr. Aviano pursuant to
the UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) portion of Mr. Aviano's Motion to Dismiss, as Plaintiffs
have suffered no damages. Consequently, the district court's decision should still be
affirmed. See, Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, | 18, 29 P.3d 1225 ("[A]n appellate
court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated
by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action.'"(citing Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Ass % 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)(plurality opinion)).
"[I]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all
reasonable inferences in his favor." Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d
1055, 1058 (Utah 1991)(emphasis added). However, mere legal conclusions will not will
not provide a sufficient basis to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as such conclusions
"are stillborn for all purposes, when they are stated in the place of ultimate facts."
Chesney v. Chesney, 94 P. 989, 992 (Utah 1903). In short, "[m]atters of substance, which
are necessary to be alleged in a complaint, cannot be left out''

Id. at 993 (emphasis

17
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added). Furthermore, the objective of Utah's liberal pleading rules "is to require that the
essential facts upon which redress is sough be set forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity
and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief
claimed." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 23 (emphasis added).
In the present case, an essential element in pleading fraud is that of damages. See,
Maack, 875 P.2d 570.

While Plaintiffs alleged that their predecessor in interest,

MagnetBank, "reasonably relied on the contents of the closing documents," See, Rec,
2963, | 809, which provide that MagnetEJank was to receive approximately $900,000.00
from the proceeds of the aforementioned real estate transaction, Plaintiffs also allege that
MagnetBank actually did receive "just under $900,000.00" Id. at 3054, | 410, and 2964,
\ 802. Simply stated, Plaintiffs allege that they relied on the closing documents, which
represented that Plaintiffs would receive a certain sum of money, and Plaintiffs did, in
fact, receive that certain sum of money, regardless of where that money came from.
Therefore, by their own allegations, accepting such allegations as true for the purposes of
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs received exactly what they thought and agreed they
would receive and, thus, have suffered no damage thereby. Consequently, Plaintiffs'
fraud-based causes of action fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano. Consequently, the
district court was also correct in dismissing such claims against Mr. Aviano pursuant to
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

///

[ CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE ]
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS ALSO CORRECT IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT AGAIN.

Although the Rules of Procedure tend to favor granting a party leave to amend its
pleadings, "the matter remains in the sound discretion of the trial court." Westley, 663
P.2d at 94. A district court is well within its discretion to deny a party leave to amend its
pleadings when doing so would cause unnecessary delay, and when the party seeking
leave has had an adequate opportunity to properly draft its pleadings.

See, Id.

Furthermore, Utah courts typically focus on three factors when considering whether to
allow a party leave to amend its pleadings. See, Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004
UT App 44, 87 P.3d 734. First, "the timeliness of the motion." Id. at f 26. Second, "the
justification given by the movant for the delay." Id. And finally, "the resulting prejudice
to the responding party." Id.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the district court was correct in not
allowing the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. For example, after eight months,
the Plaintiffs had already been allowed to amend their complaint four times prior to the
district court's dismissal without leave to amend. For example, Plaintiffs filed their
original complaint on October 20, 2009. See, Rec, 461. The Plaintiffs filed their First
Amended Complaint on November 27, 2009, thus having their second chance to properly
plead their claims. See, Rec, 2143. Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on
March 5, 2010 (third chance), as well as lengthy Errata to the Second Amended
Complaint on March 15, 2010 (fourth chance).

See, Rec, 4997 and 5048.

19
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Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' multiple attempts to properly plead their claims, the Plaintiffs
still had failed to plead fraud with particularity against Mr. Aviano, as explained in
greater detail, above. Consequently, the Plaintiffs caused at least eight months of delay,
and sought to potentially cause even more delay by trying a fifth time to properly plead
their causes of action. Therefore, because of the delay alone caused by the Plaintiffs, the
district court was correct in not allowing Plaintiffs leave to amend their Second Amended
Complaint.
In addition to the foregoing, each time the Plaintiffs attempted to amend their
pleadings, Mr. Aviano would necessarily expend a substantial amount of time, resources,
and attorneys fees, in responding to Plaintiffs' inadequate pleadings. Moreover, the
longer this case continued, the longer Mr. Aviano would be forced to conduct his life and
his business under the constant stigma of being named as a defendant in a seemingly
never-ending lawsuit.

Consequently, Mr. Aviano, as well as many other named

Defendants/Appellees,

were being

severely prejudiced,

thus providing

further

justification for the district court's decision not to allow Plaintiffs leave to amend again.
Based upon the foregoing, the district court was correct in its decision not to allow
the Plaintiffs leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE AIDING AND ABETTING AS
VALID CAUSES OF ACTION.

The Utah Court of Appeals has not recognized civil causes of action for aiding and
abetting. See, Coroles, 2003 UT App 339 at n. 19. Consequently, the district court was
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correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action pursuant to UTAH R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Even if this Court were to recognize civil causes of action for aiding and abetting,
the district court was still correct, on at least three separate grounds, in dismissing said
causes of action with respect to Mr. Aviano. Either way, the district court's decision
should be affirmed. See, Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ]f 18.
First, because the only allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint
against Mr. Aviano deal with the aforementioned real estate purchase transaction, and
because Plaintiffs' attempted basis for such allegations against Mr. Aviano rest in fraud,
and because Plaintiffs have failed to plead fraud with the requisite particularity against
Mr. Aviano, Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims were also properly dismissed. See,
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 39 ("[W]here fraud lies at the core of the action, Rule 9(b)
applies...The requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to all cases where the gravamen of the
claim is fraud even though the theory supporting the claim is not technically termed
fraud." (citing Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Or. 1985), and Adams v. NVR
Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D.Md. 2000)). Therefore, because the Plaintiffs
generally failed to adequately plead fraud against Mr. Aviano, the district court was
correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims (which used the same
allegations as their basis) with respect to Mr. Aviano.
Second, even if this Court were to recognize Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes
of action, said causes of action must necessarily fail as "[w]e only hold that if this cause
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of action is cognizable in Utah, it includes damages as an essential element." Coroles,
2003 UT App 339 at n. 19 (emphasis added). As described in greater detail, above, even
taking the Plaintiffs' allegations against Mr. Aviano as true, Plaintiffs suffered no damage
as a result of any of Mr. Aviano's alleged actions. More particularly, the Plaintiffs allege
that Mr. Aviano executed closing documents which stated that the Plaintiffs would
receive approximately $900,000.00 from the proceeds of a certain real estate purchase
transaction. See, Rec, 3054,fflf408-409. Plaintiffs further allege that they relied on Mr.
Aviano's representations made in said closing documents, and that the Plaintiffs actually
received the approximately $900,000.00 which they were supposed to receive and which
they expected to receive. See, Id. at ^f 410. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have suffered no
damages as a result of any of Mr. Aviano's alleged actions. Without suffering damages,
Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims (if valid) must necessarily fail.

Therefore, the

district court was correct in dismissing the same with respect to Mr. Aviano.
Finally, even if this Court were to recognize Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims
as being valid, Plaintiffs' claims, nevertheless, fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano
and, therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing the same with respect to Mr.
Aviano. Specifically, this Court has held that "the gravamen of the claim [of aiding and
abetting...] is the defendant's knowing participation." Russell/Packard Development,
Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316,1j 33 78 P.3d 616 (emphasis added)(internal quotations
omitted, alterations in original)(citing Future Group, II v. NationsBank, 478 S.E.2d 45
(S.C. 1996).

See also, Restatement (Second) Torts, § 874.

However, nowhere in
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Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint does the Plaintiff allege, that Mr. Aviano knew
that Mr. Simpson allegedly owed the Plaintiffs any type of fiduciary duty (or that Mr.
Aviano knew that he was allegedly helping Mr. Simpson to breach his fiduciary duty
owed to the Plaintiffs). Nor does the Second Amended Complaint allege (especially with
any particularity as required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b)) that Mr. Aviano knew that Mr.
Simpson was allegedly perpetrating a fraud upon the Plaintiffs, or that Mr. Aviano's
arms-length purchase of real property wherein the Plaintiffs suffered no damages, was a
part of Mr. Simpson's alleged fraud.
Without any allegation, or at the very least a reasonable presumption, of Mr.
Aviano's scienter with respect to the Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action,
Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action fail to state a claim against Mr. Aviano.
Consequently, the district court was correct in dismissing the same with respect to Mr.
Aviano.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with
the particularity required by UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(b) in their Second Amended Compalint,
with respect to Mr. Aviano. Even if Plaintiffs had properly plead their fraud-based cause
of action against Mr. Aviano with particularity, Plaintiffs' claims, nevertheless, failed to
state a claim against Mr. Aviano.

Consequently, the district court's dismissal of

Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims against Mr. Aviano was proper. Therefore, Mr. Aviano
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's ruling as it pertains to Mr.
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Aviano.
Furthermore, based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, including the
fact that Plaintiffs previously had four opportunities to amend their complaint, as well as
the resulting prejudice

and

delay suffered

by Mr. Aviano

and the

other

Defendants/Appellees, the district court was correct in refusing Plaintiffs leave to amend
their Second Amended Complaint.

Therefore, Mr. Aviano respectfully requests this

Court to affirm the district court's ruling as it pertains to Mr. Aviano.
Finally, because Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims are not recognized causes of
action in Utah, the district court was correct in dismissing the same. Even if Plaintiffs'
aiding and abetting claims were validly recognized causes of action, Plaintiffs' claims,
nevertheless, failed to state a claim against Mr. Aviano.

Therefore, Mr. Aviano

respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's ruling as it pertains to Mr.
Aviano.
DATED this

day of _

^KaACJA

,2011.

HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C.

)DY
MORGAN L. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee,
Michael Aviano
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UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(ll) STATEMENT
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l 1), no addendum is necessary.
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